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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : Case No. 20010268-CA 
v. : 
JESUS ISRAEL ROSILLO, : Priority No. 2 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDING 
This is an appeal from a conviction for aggravated robbery, a first degree felony, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302 (1999), in the Third Judicial District Court in and 
for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable Timothy R. Hanson, presiding. This 
Court has jurisdiction of this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j) (Supp. 
2001). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE ON APPEAL AND 
STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
Whether the court correctly denied defendant's request for a lesser included offense 
instruction on robbery? 
"We review a trial court's refusal to give a jury instruction for correctness." State v. 
Pearson, 943 P.2d 1347, 1350 (Utah 1997). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES. AND RULES 
The following determinative constitutional provisions, statutes and rules are 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
attached at Addendum A: 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-202 (1999); 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-402 (1999); 
• . Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-301 (1999); 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302 (1999). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant, Jesus Israel Rosillo, was charged with aggravated robbery, a first degree 
felony (R. 4-5). A jury convicted him of the offense (R. 116). The trial court sentenced 
defendant to a statutory five-to-life term, enhanced with a consecutive one-year term for use 
of a firearm (R. 121-22). Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal (R. 124). The Utah 
Supreme Court transferred the case to this Court (R. 140-42). 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS1 
Evidence at trial of defendant's involvement in the aggravated robbery 
Just before 2:00 a.m., on August 18,2000, Steve Lund, a bellman at Embassy Suites 
Hotel, drove to the Ute Car Wash, located at the comer of 300 South and 300 East in Salt 
Lake City, to wash a company shuttle van (R. 144:12-14). He was alone and no other 
persons were at the car wash (R. 144:14-15). As he was vacuuming the inside of the van, 
two men approached him from behind (R. 144:14-15). The two men stood next to each 
other, about five feet from Lund (R. 144:15, 31). One of the men pointed a 9 mm handgun 
at him from waist level (R. 144:16). The other man, defendant, said to Lund, "Give me your 
1
 The facts are recited in a light most favorable to the jury's verdict. See State v. 
Wright, 893 P.2d 1113, 1115 (Utah App. 1995). 
2 
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money" (R. 144:17). Lund reached into his back pocket and pulled out a "wad" of cash he 
had earned as tips and handed it to defendant (R. 144:17). Defendant pocketed the money 
(R. 144:17). Defendant then demanded Lund's wallet (R. 144:17-18). Believing his life was 
being threatened, Lund complied and handed his wallet to defendant (R. 144:18). Defendant 
opened the wallet and put it in his pocket (R. 18-19). Throughout the incident, defendant's 
companion, Andrew Mallory, remained silent, and Lund did not see either of his assailants 
communicate with each other (R. 144:17-19,51). As soon as defendant had taken the wallet, 
he and Mallory walked northward, along 300 East (R. 144:19-20). Defendant and his cohort 
accomplished the robbery in no more than a minute (R. 144:20). 
Lund continued to vacuum the van for a few moments to dispel any thought that his 
assailants might have he was following them (R. 144:20). He then got into the van and drove 
back to the hotel, where the police were called (R. 144:21). Within five minutes of his 
assailants' departure, Lund gave the dispatcher a description of defendant and Mallory (R. 
144:21). 
Jeffrey Carter, a Salt Lake City Police Officer, was in his patrol car in the rear parking 
lot of the police station when he heard the dispatch concerning the robbery (R. 144:43-45). 
The police station is only one block north of the scene of the robbery, and he responded 
immediately (R. 144:45). He did not find anyone at the scene of the robbery. However, he 
did receive information that a taxi cab had just picked up two men answering the description 
of Lund's assailants from an apartment building located between the police station and the 
3 
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car wash and that the cab was headed toward 700 North and Redwood Road (R. 144:45-46). 
Within ten or fifteen minutes of the initial dispatch, Officer Carter located the cab at State 
Street and North Temple and stopped it (R. 144:47). At this point, other officers, including 
Officer Michael Hamideh joined the stop (R. 144:47,60-62). Inside the cab, the two officers 
found defendant and Mallory (R. 144:48, 64). Officer Carter had defendant exit the cab, 
patted him down in search for a weapon, and found in defendant's back pocket a folded wad 
of money (R. 144:49-50). Officer Hamideh performed the same procedure on Mallory and 
discovered a wallet containing Lund's driver's license and credit cards (R. 144:64-68) He 
also found a "wad of cash" in the amount of $169.00, approximately the same amount that 
Officer Carter found on defendant (R. 144:67-68). About $330.00 was taken from Lund (R. 
145:39). Lund was driven to the scene of the stop, where he identified defendant and 
Mallory as the two individuals who had robbed him and the credit cards as his own (R. 
144:21-22,68,73-74). 
Approximately fifteen minutes after the police dispatch was broadcast, Sergeant Zane 
Swim went to defendant's apartment, at 228 South 300 East, about half a block from the Ute 
Car Wash (R. 144:75-78). At the apartment, Sergeant Swim and officers accompanying him 
found defendant's wife (R. 144:78-79). Sergeant Swim informed defendant's wife that 
defendant had been involved in a robbery and received permission to search the apartment 
for evidence (R. 144:79). On the floor of a small water heater closet, Sergeant Swim found 
a handgun with a wallet sitting on top of it (R. 144:79-80). Lund testified that the gun was 
4 
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like that the one Mallory held on him and that the wallet was like his own (R. 144:27, 81 -82; 
State's Exhibits 4, 5, 7 and 8). 
Defendant's Denial of Involvement in the Robbery 
Defendant testified that Mallory and his family were living with him and his wife until 
Mallory could get his own apartment (R. 145:3-8). On the night of the robbery, he and 
Mallory were walking near the car wash. As they approached it, Mallory suggested that they 
rob someone and as they neared the victim from behind, Mallory pulled "something" out of 
his pants (R. 145:9-12). According to defendant, he initially thought Mallory was going to 
ask the victim something, but he eventually recognized that Mallory had pulled a gun and 
was pointing it at close range at the victim's chest (R. 145:11-14). Defendant claimed 
Mallory demanded money from the victim and, although defendant did not say anything at 
that point, the victim handed defendant his wallet and a "wad" of money (R. 145:14). 
Defendant took it because he was concerned that Mallory might shoot the victim and he did 
not know what else to do - - "it seemed to me I didn't have any choice,... so I just decided 
to go along with it" (R. 145:15). Defendant then "turned around and walked away as soon 
as possible and . . . walked back to the apartment" (R. 145:15). 
Defendant testified that when Mallory caught up with defendant moments later, he 
said to defendant, "Give me the wallet and the money," which defendant did (R. 145:15,33). 
When they arrived at defendant's apartment, defendant told Mallory that he (Mallory) could 
no longer stay there (R. 145:16). Mallory retorted that he had no place to go (R. 145:16). 
5 
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Mallory then awakened his wife and talked with her. According to defendant, Mallory's wife 
approached him, explained that she had no place to go, and handed him $150.00 with the 
understanding that she would remain, but that Mallory would leave (R. 145:16). Defendant, 
however, refused the arrangement, insisting that they both had to leave by the following day. 
He also explained that he was going to try to spend the night at his uncle's house (R. 145:16-
17). Defendant then called a taxi cab to take him to his uncle's house (R. 145:17). 
When the taxi arrived, defendant allowed Mallory to join him, with the unstated 
intention of dropping Mallory off somewhere (R. 145:17-18). En route to his uncle's house, 
defendant and Mallory were stopped by police officers (R. 145:18). After receiving his 
Miranda rights, defendant agreed to speak with the officers and told them everything that 
happened at the car wash (R. 145:18,43-44).2 
On cross-examination, defendant continued to emphatically deny all involvement in 
the robbery: (1) he only intended to go out to a nearby 7-11 store to get some food for his 
wife and children at about 2:00 a.m., just before the incident (R. 145:24-26); (2) he paid no 
attention to Mallory's suggestion that they rob someone (R. 145:28); (3) he never saw the 
gun until Mallory pulled it out (R. 145:22); (4) he moved away from Mallory when he saw 
Mallory pull out the gun (R. 145:27-28); (5) at the point Mallory drew the gun it was too late 
to say anything (R. 145:28); (6) he never asked the victim for money (R. 145:29-30); (7) only 
Mallory asked the victim for money (R. 145:29); (8) he could not understand why Lund 
2
 See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 1612 (1966). 
6 
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handed the cash and wallet to him when only Mallory had made the demands (R. 145:30-31); 
(9) he "was put in the situation," and was only "trying to keep things calm" (R. 145:31); (10) 
he was not sure that the money that Mallory's wife gave him actually belonged to Lund, 
although he admitted that it might have been Lund's money (R. 145:34); (11) he denied 
telling Officer Carter that Mallory, as opposed to Mallory's wife, gave him the money the 
police found on him (R. 145: 35-36,39). In further confirmation of his denial of complicity, 
defendant told Officer Carter that he did not participate at all in the robbery (R. 145:44). 
At trial, defendant excepted to the trial court's refusal to give a lesser included offense 
instruction on robbery (R. 145:53). The trial court denied the request because there was no 
evidence that defendant was not aware that a firearm was being used at the time the robbery 
took place (R. 145:53). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial court correctly denied defendant' s request for a lesser offense instruction on 
robbery under the test set out in State v. Baker, 671 P.2d 152,158-59 (Utah 1983). The State 
recognizes that robbery is a lesser included offense of aggravated robbery and that there was 
a rational basis in the evidence to acquit defendant of the charged offense, based on 
defendant' s testimony. However, because defendant denied any culpability for the robbery, 
there was no rational basis for also convicting him of the lesser offense, as required by Baker. 
Even if there was error, it was harmless because there was compelling testimonial and 
physical evidence of defendant's complicity in the aggravated robbery. 
7 
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ARGUMENT 
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY DENIED DEFENDANT'S 
REQUEST FOR A LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSE INSTRUCTION 
BECAUSE THERE WAS NO RATIONAL BASIS FOR CONVICTING 
DEFENDANT OF SIMPLE ROBBERY; ANY ERROR WAS 
HARMLESS BECAUSE EVIDENCE OF DEFENDANT'S GUILT FOR 
COMMITTING AGGRAVATED ROBBERY WAS COMPELLING 
Defendant claims the trial court improperly refused to give the jury a lesser included 
offense instruction on simple robbery, thereby leaving the jury with a choice only to convict 
or acquit him of the greater offense of aggravated robbery. Aplt. Br. at 8-9,17. Defendant 
argues that the lesser included offense instruction should have been given because there was 
a rational basis in the evidence to conclude that defendant was not a party to Mallory's use 
of a gun in committing an aggravated robbery. Aplt. Br. at 13-19. He also argues that there 
was a rational basis for the jury to find that he had committed only simple robbery. Aplt. Br. 
at 19-20. Finally, defendant argues that the trial court's error was prejudicial because 
evidence of the aggravated robbery was not nearly so great as in other cases that found a trial 
court's failure to provide a requested lesser included offense instruction harmless. 
Defendant's argument fails because there is no rational basis in the evidence to convict him 
of simple robbery under either the State's or his rendition of the events. Even if there were 
error, it was harmless because evidence of his committing aggravated assault is compelling. 
A. A defendant's request for a lesser included offense instruction is 
warranted only when there is both a rational basis in the evidence 
to acquit on the greater offense and to convict on the lesser offense. 
Under State v.Baker, 671 P.2d 152, 158-59 (Utah 1983), a defendant is entitled to a 
8 
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requested lesser offense instruction only if (1) the statutory elements of the greater and lesser 
crimes overlap and the evidence of the greater offense includes proof of some or all of the 
overlapping elements, and (2) the evidence at trial provides a "rational basis for a verdict 
acquitting the defendant of the offense charged and convicting him of the included offense." 
See also Utah Code Ann. § 76-l-402(3)(a), -(4); State v. Pearson, 943 P.2d 1347,1350 (Utah 
1997); State v. Standiford, 769 P.2d 254, 266-67 (Utah 1988); State v. Shabata, 678 P.2d 
785, 790 (Utah 1984). 
As a general rule, this Court has liberally construed the Baker requirements to allow 
a lesser offense instruction when requested by a defendant. State v. Hansen, 734 P.2d 421, 
424 (Utah 1986) (plurality opinion); see also State v. Piansiaksone, 954 P.2d 861,871 (Utah 
1998). This "serves the fundamental policy of permitting the jury to find a defendant guilty 
of any offense that fits the facts, rather than forcing it to elect between the charges the 
prosecutor chooses to file and an acquittal." Hansen, 734 P.2d at 424. Also, a lesser offense 
instruction in some cases may be necessary to allow a defendant to place his theory of the 
case before the jury. See Piansiaksone, 954 P.2d at 870; Standiford, 769 P.2d at 266-67. 
Nevertheless, a defendant's right to a lesser offense instruction is neither absolute nor 
unqualified. Baker, 671 P.2d at 157; Standiford, 769 P.2d at 266-67; State v. Crick, 675 P.2d 
527, 531-32 (Utah 1983). The right to such an instruction is not based on "some supposed 
notion of the jury's compassion or leniency," and the "'jury's power to dispense mercy, by 
favoring the defendant despite the evidence, should not be allowed to so dominate the trial 
9 
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proceedings as to impede or interfere with the jury's primary fact-finding function.'" Baker, 
671 P.2d at 157 (quoting People v. Mussenden, 127 N.E.2d 551, 554 (N.Y. 1955)). 
The State does not dispute that, for the purposes of this case, robbery is a lesser 
included offense of aggravated robbery, as defendant contends. Aplt. Br. at 9-12. A lesser 
offense is included when "[i]t is established by proof of the same or less than all the facts 
required to establish the commission of the offense chargedf.]" Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-
402(3) (a) (1999); Baker, 671 P.2d at 158 (citing section 76-1 -402(3)(a)). "A person 
commits aggravated robbery if in the course of committing robbery, h e . . . uses or threatens 
to use a dangerous weapon as defined in Section 76-1-601 [.]" Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302 
(1 )(a) (1999) (emphasis added). See Hansen, 734 P.2d at 424 ("[T]he [Baker] test is whether 
the elements overlap at all."). 
Further, the State does not contest that under the Baker standard, there was a rational 
basis in the evidence for acquitting defendant of the charged offense, aggravated robbery. 
Aplt. Br. at 13-19. It was undisputed that only Mallory used a dangerous weapon (R. 144:16; 
145:11-14). Defendant was charged as a party to aggravated robbery, all of the State's 
evidence and closing argument was directed to proving defendant guilty as an accomplice, 
and the jury was instructed accordingly (R. 4-5, 91, 105, 108; 144:12-82; 145:61-66).3 
3
 Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-202 (1999), provides for party liability: 
Every person, acting with the mental state required for the 
commission of an offense who directly commits the offense, who solicits, 
requests, commands, encourages, or intentionally aids another person to 
engage in conduct which constitutes an offense shall be criminally liable as 
a party for such conduct. 
10 
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However, defendant's entire testimony was that he never intended to take anything from 
Lund, but rather acted only to calm the situation and prevent Mallory from acting rashly (R. 
145:3-39). Since the rational basis test "does not require the court to weigh the credibility 
of the evidence," see Baker, 671 P.2d at 159, the State is constrained to recognize that, 
notwithstanding defendant's patently doubtful credibility, that defendant established a 
rational basis in the evidence upon which the jury could have acquitted him of aggravated 
robbery.4 
However, it is not enough to find that the evidence would support an acquittal on the 
charged offense. Rather, if "the evidence is ambiguous and susceptible to alternative 
explanations, the trial court must give the lesser included offense instruction if any one of the 
alternative interpretations provides both a rational basis for a verdict acquitting the defendant 
of the offense charged and convicting him of the included offense." State v. Velarde, 734 
P.2d 449,451 (Utah 1986) (citations omitted) (emphasis added). Utah appellate courts have 
regularly found that a request for a lesser included offense instruction was properly refused 
where, although there was a sufficient quantum of evidence to acquit on the greater offense, 
4
 But see See Standiford, 769 P.2d at 267 (holding no rational basis for negligent 
homicide where, in spite of the defendant's claims that the victim threatened him with a 
gun, 107 stab wounds in the victim's body bespoke at least a knowledge of a risk of 
death); State v. Clayton, 658 P.2d 624, 626 (Utah 1983) (no rational basis for belief that 
circumstances provided legal justification for homicide where, in spite of the defendant's 
claims that he shot the victim to prevent himself from a knife attack, two eyewitnesses 
testified that victim never threatened the defendant in any way); State v. Lopez, 626 P.2d 
483, 484-86 (Utah 1981). These cases suggest that there is a point at which a defendant's 
self-serving statements are so incredible that standing alone they do not present a rational 
basis for acquittal of the charged offense. 
11 
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the same evidence necessarily led to an acquittal on the lesser offense. See State v. Shabata, 
678 P.2d 785,790 (Utah 1984) (manslaughter instruction unwarranted in murder conviction 
where there was no evidence that the defendant ever heard a tape recording that could 
conceivably have given rise to killing "in heat of passion," and all of the evidence presented 
by the defendant was that he did not argue with, injure, or kill the victim); Crick, 675 P.2d 
at 533-34 (manslaughter instruction properly refused in murder conviction where defendants' 
attempted to show that they had not caused the victim's death); Baker, 671 P.2d at 160 
(criminal trespass instruction unwarranted in burglary conviction where defense of 
intoxication was to negate any specific intent); State v. Cox, 826 P.2d 656, 662-63 (Utah 
App. 1992) (instruction on criminal trespass properly denied in burglary conviction where 
defendant testified he never entered the premises); State v. Sherard, 818 P.2d 554,560 (Utah 
App. 1991) (instruction on negligent homicide unwarranted in murder conviction where 
witness testified the defendant acknowledged stabbing the victim). 
Contrary to defendant's assertion, there is no rational basis in the evidence for 
convicting defendant for mere robbery. Defendant asserts that the jury could have convicted 
him of simple robbery "based on Rosillo's testimony that he participated in the matter, in that 
he unlawfully took the money from Lund." Aplt. Br. at 19. However, as set out in detail at 
pages five through seven, above, defendant at trial consistently denied any intention 
whatsoever to rob Lund, with or without a gun. Defendant testified that as he and Mallory 
approached Lund, Mallory suggested that they rob him and almost immediately pulled out 
12 
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a gun, pointed it at Lund, and demanded money (R. 145:9-14). In these circumstances, 
defendant did not think he had any choice other than to go along with Mallory, in an effort 
to keep the situation calm and from escalating (R. 145:15,28,31). Defendant claimed that 
he paid no attention to Mallory's suggestion that they rob Lund, that he never asked Lund for 
money, and that he was nonplused by Lund's handing him, rather than Mallory, the money 
and the wallet (R. 145:28-31). Suggesting that he intended and wanted no part of the 
incident, defendant also claimed that he immediately left the scene, handed the money and 
wallet over to Mallory as soon as he asked for it, told Mallory that he could no longer stay 
at his house, and planned to leave Mallory off somewhere en route to his uncle's house (R. 
145:15-18, 33). In further support of this theory, defendant indicated that the was not even 
sure that the money Mallory's wife allegedly gave him for her rent were the ill-gotten gains 
of robbing Lund (R. 145:34). Finally, defendant told Officer Carter that he did not 
participate in the robbery (R. 145:44). In other words, defendant's testimony amounts to 
nothing more than a claim that defendant was a mere bystander to all of Mallory's criminal 
acts, not merely his use of a dangerous weapon, and that he did nothing to solicit, encourage, 
or aid Mallory in the robbery. 
Defendant also suggests that Lund's testimony supports the giving of a lesser offense 
instruction on robbery. Aplt. Br. at 20. However, all of the referenced testimony goes only 
to show, albeit not very persuasively, that Lund might have been mistaken in identifying 
defendant as the man who demanded his money. Such evidence, however, would only tend 
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to refute defendant's complicity in any type of robbery and thus fail to satisfy the Baker 
requirement that there be a rational basis for a conviction on the lesser offense. 
Defendant compares this case to Hansen, wherein the supreme court found the trial 
court improperly refused a request for a lesser offense instruction. Hansen, 734 P.2d at 424, 
427-28. Hansen, however, is distinguishable from this case. In Hansen, the defendant, 
Hansen, and an accomplice went to the victim's house, hog-tied the victim, and stole items 
of personal property. Id. at 422. The house was then set on fire, which killed the victim. Id. 
Hansen and his accomplice then immediately drove to another house where they did 
essentially the same things as at the first house; however this second victim escaped. Id. 
Hansen was charged with first degree murder for having knowingly killed the first 
victim during the commission of an aggravated arson. Id. At trial, the State presented 
evidence tending to prove that Hansen committed robbery and burglary, as well as arson. Id. 
at 422-23. However, Hansen testified that he held a gun on the victim and then tied him up 
only to accomplish the robbery/burglary, and that he was completely unaware that his 
accomplice in those offenses had set fire to the house, from which he fled. Id. 
The trial court instructed the jury on the offense of first degree murder as charged. 
Id. at 423. Consistent with his testimony about his participation in the robbery/burglary, 
Hansen requested a lesser offense instruction on felony-murder, based on this theory that the 
victim's death was unintentional and occurred during a robbery or burglary, to which he 
admitted. Id. The trial court denied the request, although it did give felony-murder and 
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manslaughter instructions, premised on Hansen's participation in the arson. Id. Hansen was 
convicted of first degree murder, as charged. Id. 
The Utah Supreme Court found that the requested instruction should have been given: 
The second element of the Baker test also was satisfied: the 
evidence provided a rational basis for the jury to acquit on the first degree 
murder charge and convict on the requested second degree murder, charge. 
On the facts before it, if the jury believed Hansen fs testimony, it could 
rationally have found (i) that he was not guilty of arson and did not have the 
mental state required for first degree murder, but (ii) that Hansen did 
commit robbery or burglary, that Stewart was killed during the course of 
that crime, and that Hansen did not intend or know that Stewart's death 
would result. This would warrant a verdict of guilty on Hansen's requested 
felony-murder instruction. [Emphasis added.] 
Id. at 424,427-28. Elaborating on its holding that the trial court's error was prejudicial, the 
court observed that by refusing the requested instruction the trial court never gave the jury 
the opportunity to consider whether Hansen might have been guilty of some offense related 
to his admitted participation in the robbery/burglary, as opposed to the arson. Id. at 428. 
In contrast, as set out above, defendant' s testimony went only to his innocence on both 
the charged offense of aggravated robbery and simple robbery. In sum, because defendant's 
entire testimony and any evidence adduced on appeal was that defendant played no part in 
any robbery, there was no rational basis in the evidence for the requested lesser offense 
instruction. Thus, if the jury believed defendant's testimony it was bound to acquit him, not 
to convict him of a lesser offense he denied committing. See State v. Shabata, 678 P.2d 785, 
790 (Utah 1984); Crick, 675 P.2d at 533-34; Baker, 671 P.2d at 160; State v. Cox, 826 P.2d 
656, 662-63 (Utah App. 1992); State v. Sherard, 818 P.2d 554, 560 (Utah App. 1991). In 
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any event, any error in the court's refusing to give defendant's requested lesser offense 
instruction on robbery was harmless. 
B. Any error in refusing the requested instruction on 
robbery was harmless in light of the compelling evidence 
of defendant's guilt for aggravated robbery. 
"'An erroneous decision by a trial court cannot result in reversible error unless the 
error is harmful.'" Piansiaksone, 954 P.2d at 870 (finding instructional error harmless where 
there was no evidence to support manslaughter conviction) (quoting State v. Robertson, 932 
P.2d 1219, 1227 (Utah 1997)). "'Harmless error is an error that is sufficiently 
inconsequential that there is no reasonable likelihood that it affected the outcome of the 
proceedings. Put differently, an error is harmful only if the likelihood of a different outcome 
is sufficiently high that it undermines our confidence fin the verdict.'" Id. (quoting 
Robertson, at 1227). In this case, defendant was not entitled to an instruction on simple 
robbery because "the evidence in support thereof was so slight that all reasonable people 
would have to conclude against the defendant on that point." Piansiaksone, 954 P.2d at 871 
(no basis in evidence that the defendant killed the victim as a result of extreme emotional 
disturbance) (citing State v. Harding, 635 P.2d 33, 34 (Utah 1981)). 
In an effort to persuade this Court that any error in refusing his requested lesser 
offense instruction was prejudicial, defendant argues that the evidence of the charged offense 
in this case was not so compelling as in other cases in which an erroneous refusal to give a 
lesser offense instruction was found harmless. Aplt. Br. at 24-29. In support, defendant 
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cites Baker and State v. Kruger, 2000 UT 60,6 P.2d 1116. Neither of these cases, however, 
turned on a harmless error analysis, but rather on a failure to present a rational basis for either 
acquittal on the charged offense or conviction on the lesser offense. 
In Baker, the defendant, charged with burglary, acknowledged breaking into a gas 
station and forcibly opening a locked desk. Baker, 671 P.2d at 159. His defense at trial was 
that he was too intoxicated to have formed the necessary intent for the offense. Id. The only 
evidence of intoxication was the testimony of a friend who testified that he observed 
symptoms of intoxication in the defendant's behavior earlier in the day. However, the 
witness also testified that when the defendant was later stopped while driving, the police 
smelled the defendant's breath, but did not give him a field sobriety test or prevent him from 
driving away. Id. The Utah Supreme Court found that there was not a sufficient quantum 
of evidence regarding defendant' s capacity to form an intent, and therefore the defendant was 
not entitled to a lesser included offense instruction on criminal trespass. Id. at 160. 
Alternatively, the court found that even if the evidence were sufficient on the question of 
intent, it would also have defeated his claim of intent to commit criminal mischief. Id. 
Similarly, the court in Kruger found no error in the trial court's refusal to give a lesser 
offense instruction. Kruger, 2000 UT 60, ^ 16. In Kruger, the defendant was charged with 
felony murder for killing an automobile driver while trying to rob him. Id. at f 10. At trial, 
Kruger requested a lesser included offense instruction on manslaughter, contending that the 
shooting was the result of extreme emotional disturbance, or in the alternative, recklessness. 
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Id. In support of his request, Kruger offered the testimony of his sister, who testified that 
although Kruger told her that he had shot someone while attempting to commit a robbery, she 
did not initially believe him because he often fantasized or exaggerated. Id, at f l7 . The 
court found that this speculative testimony "[did] not constitute a sufficient quantum of 
evidence to provide a rational basis to acquit Kruger of attempting to rob [the victim] and 
thus acquit him of felonymurder." Id. at^[19.5 
Defendant also argues that the evidence in support of harmless error in State v. Evans, 
2001 UT 22,20 P.3d 888, far outstrips the inculpatory evidence in this case. Aplt. Br. at 24-
27. In that case, the defendant was charged with attempted aggravated murder of a police 
officer during a traffic stop. Id. at 1fl[l-2. At trial, defendant requested a lesser included 
offense instruction on manslaughter, which the trial court refused. Id. at % 18. The Evans 
court found that Evans was entitled to the instruction based only on his testimony that he did 
not know the victim was a police officer. Id. at f 19. However, the court found the error 
harmless because two occupants in Evans' car testified that they and Evans knew they were 
being "pulled over," and because several witnesses on the street, the three police officers 
involved in the stop, and the occupants of Evans' car, testified that the victim/officer's patrol 
car clearly displayed flashing emergency lights. Zi. at ff 20-21. 
As noted above, the ultimate test of harmlessness is whether the alleged error creates 
5
 The court then arguably gave what might be considered a harmless error 
opinion, noting that no reasonable jury could have disregarded the testimony of four 
witnesses to whom Kruger had confessed the offense. Kruger, 2000 UT 60, f 19. 
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a sufficient likelihood of a different outcome so as to undermine the reviewing court's 
confidence in the verdict. As discussed below, evidence of defendant's guilt in committing 
aggravated robbery readily satisfies the harmless error standard. Moreover, even if this Court 
regarded Baker and Kruger, along with Evans, as measuring sticks for the application of 
harmless error analysis, the compelling evidence of defendant's guilt would compare 
favorably. 
Lund testified that defendant and Mallory both approached him from behind while he 
was alone at the car wash at 2:00 o'clock in the morning (R. 144:12-15). When Lund turned 
around, he saw defendant and Mallory standing next to each other, only five feet from him 
(R. 144:15-16). Mallory pointed a 9 mm handgun at him (R. 144:16). Defendant said to 
Lund, "Give me your money" (R. 144:17). Lund handed defendant a "wad" of cash, which 
defendant pocketed (R. 144:17). Defendant then demanded Lund's wallet, which Lund also 
relinquished to defendant, feeling his life was being threatened (R. 144: 17-18). Defendant 
opened the wallet, looked into it, and then closed it and put it into his pocket (R. 144:18-19). 
In all, Lund had approximately $330.00 taken from him by defendant (R. 145:39). Lund 
never saw his assailants communicate with each other. The entire incident lasted no more 
than a minute, after which defendant and Mallory immediately left (R. 144:17-20). 
Within a half-hour of the incident, defendant and Mallory were apprehended together 
in a taxi cab not far from the scene of the crime (R. 144:21, 47). Officers searched both 
Mallory and defendant. On Mallory they found Lund's driver's license and credit cards and 
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a "wad of cash" in the amount of $169.00 (R. 144:64-68). On defendant they also found a 
folded "wad" of money in the approximate amount of $169.00 (R. 144:49-50; 145:67-68). 
In defendant's apartment, within one-half block of the crime scene, police found a handgun 
like the one Mallory used and a wallet Lund described as like his own, hidden on the floor 
of a small water heater closet (R. 144:27, 79-82).
 :u 
The evidence undisputedly proves that Lund was the victim of an aggravated robbery. 
The only evidence that defendant was not an accomplice to the entire incident is his own 
testimony, which amounted to a repeated, consistent denial of any responsibility for any 
robbery at all (R. 145:9-44). In particular, defendant testified that the robbery was Mallory's 
idea in which he played no active part except to keep the situation calm by accepting Lund's 
money after Mallory, not he, demanded it (R. 145:9-15). After the robbery, defendant 
claimed that he tried to dissociate himself from the event by immediately leaving the scene, 
handing the money and wallet over to Mallory as soon as he asked for it, telling Mallory that 
he could no longer stay at his house, and in intending to leave Mallory off somewhere en 
route to his uncle's house (R. 145:15-18, 33). 
However, the facts belie defendant's testimony and, consequently, his credibility. 
There is nothing in Lund's rendition of the events to indicate that defendant did not play as 
active a role in the aggravated robbery as Mallory. Additionally, defendant went beyond any 
appearance of simply placating Mallory when he made a second demand for Lund's money 
(R. 144:17-18). More importantly, the physical evidence rebuts defendant's denial of 
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complicity. Both he and Mallory, within one-half hour after the robbery, were each found 
with almost exactly half of the sum of money stolen from Lund (R. 144:64-68; 145:39). 
"Defendant asks much of the jury," see Evans, 2001 UT 22, [^23, in suggesting that the 
money found on him was essentially the $150.00 allegedly given to him by Mallory's wife, 
since defendant himself testified that Mallory and his wife were staying with him because 
they "didn't have anything and didn't have any place to go" (R. 144:145:8, 16). Finally, a 
wallet like Lund's and a handgun like that used in the robbery were found on the floor of the 
water heater closet in defendant's apartment, from which defendant had assertedly excluded 
Mallory (R. 144:27,79-82). All of this evidence not only destroyed defendant's credibility, 
the only counterpoise to Lund's rendition of the events, but also constituted independent 
physical evidence in support of defendant's complicity in the aggravated robbery. In sum, 
any error in the trial court's refusing defendant's requested lesser included offense instruction 
on simple robbery was harmless. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing discussion, the State respectfully requests that defendant's 
conviction be affirmed. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 2tf day of October, 2001. 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF 
Attorney General 
KENNETH A. BRONSTON 
Assistant Attorney General 
21 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
CERTIFICATE OF HAND DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that two true and accurate copies of the foregoing Brief of Appellee 
were hand delivered to Linda M. Jones and Lisa J Remal, Salt Lake Legal Defender Assoc, 
attorneys for appellant, 424 East 500 South, Suite 300, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, this 7*? ' 
day of October, 2001. 
^ C < ^ ^ ^ / ^ / > - > g ^ 
22 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
ADDENDA 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
ADDENDUM A 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
UTAH CRIMINAL CODE 
76-1-402, Separate offenses arising out of single criminal 
episode — Included offenses. 
(1) A defendant may be prosecuted in a single criminal action for all 
separate offenses arising out of a single criminal episode; however, when the 
same act of a defendant under a single criminal episode shall establish offenses 
which may be punished in different ways under different provisions of this 
code, the act shall be punishable under only one such provision; an acquittal or 
conviction and sentence under any such provision bars a prosecution under 
any other such provision. 
(2) Whenever conduct may establish separate offenses under a single 
criminal episode, unless the court otherwise orders to promote justice, a 
defendant shall not be subject to separate trials for multiple offenses when: 
(a) The offenses are within the jurisdiction of a single court; and 
(b) The offenses are known to the prosecuting attorney at the time the 
defendant is arraigned on the first information or indictment. 
(3) A defendant may be convicted of an offense included in the offense 
charged but may not be convicted of both the offense charged and the included 
offense. An offense is so included when: 
(a) It is established by proof of the same or less than all the facts 
required to establish the commission of the offense charged; or 
(b) It constitutes an attempt, solicitation, conspiracy, or form of prepa-
ration to commit the offense charged or an offense otherwise included 
therein; or 
(c) It is specifically designated by a statute as a lesser included offense. 
(4) The court shall not be obligated to charge the jury with respect to an 
included offense unless there is a rational basis for a verdict acquitting the 
defendant of the offense charged and convicting him of the included offense. 
(5) If the district court on motion after verdict or judgment, or an appellate 
court on appeal or certiorari, shall determine that there is insufficient evidence 
to support a conviction for the offense charged but that there is sufficient 
evidence to support a conviction for an included offense and the trier of fact 
necessarily found every fact required for conviction of that included offense, 
the verdict or judgment of conviction may be set aside or reversed and a 
judgment of conviction entered for the included offense, without necessity of a 
new trial, if such relief is sought by the defendant. 
76-2-202. Criminal responsibility for direct commission 
of offense or for conduct of another. 
Every person, acting with the mental state required for the commission of an 
offense who directly commits the offense, who solicits, requests, commands, 
encourages, or intentionally aids another person to engage in conduct which 
constitutes an offense shall be criminally liable as a party for such conduct. 
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76.6-301. Robbery. 
(1) A person commits robbery if: 
(a) the person unlawfully and intentionally takes or attempts to take 
personal property in the possession of another from his person, or 
immediate presence, against his will, by means of force or fear; or 
(b) the person intentionally or knowingly uses force or fear of immedi-
ate force against another in the course of committing a theft. 
(2) An act shall be considered "in the course of committing a theft* if it 
occurs in an attempt to commit theft, commission of theft, or in the immediate 
flight after the attempt or commission. 
(3) Robbery is a felony of the second degree. 
76-6-302. Aggravated robbery. 
(1) A person commit^ aggravated robbery if in the course of committing 
robbery, he: 
(a) uses or threatens to use a dangerous weapon as defined in Section 
76-1-601; 
(b) causes serious bodily injury upon another; or 
(c) takes an operable motor vehicle. 
(2) Aggravated robbery is a first degree felony. 
(3) For the purposes of this part, an act shall be considered to be "in the 
course of committing a robbery* if it occurs in an attempt to commit, during the 
commission of, or in the immediate flight after the attempt or commission of a 
robbery. 
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